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The New Asian Development Finance*
Karin Costa Vazquez1 and Yu Zheng2
Abstract The recent challenges posed for multilateralism and 
the emergence of a sustainable development regime have 
pushed countries to engage in more flexible, issue-based 
development finance initiatives and institutions. These changes 
have profoundly impacted how China conceives and delivers 
its development finance. How is China’s development finance 
being shaped by other countries’ experiences? How has China 
been shaping development finance globally? This article 
argues that China’s development finance has been increasingly 
market-oriented, concerned about financial and environmental 
sustainability, and delivered through hybrid bilateral–multilateral 
channels, particularly since the launch of the Belt and Road 
Initiative. Shaped by the changes that China experienced at 
both international and domestic levels, these new features signal 
the rise of a ‘new Asian development finance’ that is refocusing 
the global debate on the importance of combining aid, trade, 
and investment under financially and environmentally sustainable 
frameworks, and channelling development finance through 
multilateral channels to catalyse structural transformation.
Keywords development finance, the Asian model, multilateralism, 
sustainable development.
1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, the global economic landscape has 
been shifting with the rise of emerging economies and developing 
countries, on the one side, and the relative decline of developed 
countries’ share in world output, on the other. These changing 
dynamics in the global economy have also had a profound effect 
on international development as emerging economies become 
even more important sources of development finance on both 
bilateral and multilateral fronts. More recently, the challenges 
posed for multilateralism have pushed countries worldwide to 
prefer more flexible, fluid, and issue-based development finance 
initiatives and institutions over models of global economic 
governance that prioritise negotiations within standing, formal, 
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treaty-based bodies with universal membership (Patrick 2015, 2019; 
Ikenberry 2018; Vazquez 2021).
The emergence of international commitments to sustainable 
development, signalled by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (the 2030 Agenda), the Paris Agreement on climate 
change, and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda for financing 
sustainable development, has further pushed countries to 
align their own development goals more closely with notions of 
sustainability. The creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) 
and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015 reflects 
these changes, with both institutions born out of two innovative 
platforms for multilateralism: South–South cooperation and a 
mandate anchored on sustainability (Vazquez, Roychoudhury and 
Borges 2017; Vazquez and Chin 2019; Vazquez 2021).
With four decades of remarkable economic performance, China 
has also become more confident in sharing its development 
experiences with other emerging and developing countries. 
This can be seen in the expansion of the transformation of 
development finance. Three new features have emerged as 
China’s development finance has transformed itself over the last 
decade under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) umbrella. First, it 
has adopted a more market-oriented strategy through an explicit 
combination of aid, trade, and investments. Second, it is more 
concerned about financial and environmental sustainability in 
response to the rising concern of debt distress and environmental 
impact. Third, it has become hybrid in nature as it is increasingly 
being delivered through earmarked United Nations (UN) 
programmes and the new multilateral development banks. These 
new features, we argue, have been prompted by institutional 
changes in China’s aid coordination system and slowly shaped 
by China’s economic rebalancing and the changing global 
landscape, particularly after the 2008 global financial crisis.
Other Asian economies also share similar features in conceiving 
and delivering their development finance, signalling the rise of 
a new development finance model that has China and, more 
broadly, Asia at its epicentre. This new Asian development finance 
has been refocusing the global debate on the importance 
of state-led (blended) finance to support infrastructure and 
sustainable development, both as a driver to endogenous 
structural transformation and economic growth as well as a tool 
to advance countries’ economic, policy, and strategic goals. More 
than a convergence between traditional donors and emerging 
economies, the new Asian development finance could signal the 
emergence of alternative narratives in international cooperation 
for development.
2 The new features of China’s development finance
Over the last decade, China has extensively increased its 
development finance, becoming one of the leading capital 
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providers in developing countries. Three new features of China’s 
development finance have emerged during the time, as 
summarised in Table 1.
2.1 Increasing market orientation
The first feature of China’s new development finance is its 
increasing market orientation, as evidenced by the more explicit 
combination of official development assistance (ODA)-like aid 
and commercial forms of economic engagement. Today, China’s 
development finance is less about the narrow construct of ‘aid’ 
or ODA, as defined by the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) in terms of grants, interest-free loans, 
and concessional loans, and more about export buyers’ credits, 
non-concessional loans, strategic lines of credit, and other 
resource flows such as remittances (Lakatos et al. 2016; Mawdsley 
2021; Mulakala 2021; SCIO 2021).
Even though Chinese development finance has long had a 
commercial nature, the percentage of aid has been declining 
over the past decade while the commercial part of the finance 
continues to increase, especially after the launch of the BRI. From 
2003 to 2019, Chinese development finance to Africa increased 
from US$20bn to US$340bn, but China’s global foreign aid only 
increased from US$0.6bn to US$3.1bn.3 Foreign aid expenditure 
even dropped sharply after 2015 before it rebounded to a new 
high in 2019. This trend can also be observed in the 2015 and 2018 
editions of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 
when the country pledged a total of US$120bn in financing 
for Africa, of which only a small proportion came in the form of 
grants, interest-free loans, or concessional loans.4 Indeed, after 
the creation of two policy banks – the Export–Import Bank of 
China (China Exim Bank) and the China Development Bank (CDB) 
– the proportion of concessional loans (issued by the Exim Bank) 
Table 1 The new features of China’s development finance
Development finance Features Evidence
Types Increasing market orientation Declining share of aid in development 
finance
Criteria Emphasis on financial and environmental 
sustainability
Debt sustainability framework, green 
investment and financing regulations, 
new multilateral development banks’ 
commitment to sustainability, more 
renewable energy projects
Channels Hybrid multilateral–bilateral channels More earmarked multilateral funds, and 
new multilateral development banks, credit 
programmes, and special funds 
Source Authors’ own.
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and non-concessional loans (mainly issued by the CDB) rose, 
while the proportion of interest-free loans dropped sharply 
(Morgan and Zheng 2019; Chen 2020).
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, commercial 
financial institutions have also become important sources of 
development finance. The number of Chinese creditors in the 
overseas market expanded from two public lenders (Exim Bank 
and the CDB) in 2000 to over 30 lenders, including commercial 
banks and other private creditors in 2019 (Acker and Brautigam 
2021). The increase in the number of private creditors in China’s 
development finance signals a new trend whereby public–
private partnerships are being used to supplement state-led aid 
programmes as they help alleviate political and financial risks 
associated with China’s aid programmes on the one side, and 
expand sources of development finance, on the other.
2.2 Emphasis on financial and environmental sustainability
China’s new development finance has also emphasised 
financial and environmental sustainability. Over the last decade, 
China has become the leading official creditor to low-income 
developing countries, many of which are former highly indebted 
poor countries and where Chinese capital is particularly 
important for the financing of large-scale energy and mining 
projects (Horn, Reinhart and Trebesch 2019). Given the growing 
concern regarding high debt burdens, China has begun to 
look more closely into the financial sustainability of its overseas 
development finance. In 2018, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
released a debt sustainability framework for the BRI low-income 
countries similar to that of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (MOF 2019). Under this framework, Chinese lenders 
are encouraged to direct development finance to countries that 
have not previously asked for debt relief while countries with weak 
records of debt management are likely to receive less capital 
(Gallagher and Ray 2020; Acker and Brautigam 2021).
Regarding environmental sustainability, since 2012, China’s financial 
regulators have issued a number of regulations in pursuit of green 
investment and financing. In 2021 alone, China launched the 
world’s largest carbon market, released guidelines to align Chinese 
international cooperation and foreign investment with green 
development principles, and published a roadmap towards the 
decarbonisation of its economy by 2060. China has become the 
second largest green bond issuer in the world, accounting for a 
quarter of newly issued global green bonds in 2018 (CDB and UNDP 
2019). The major development finance platforms and institutions like 
the two new multilateral development banks have included notions 
of environmental sustainability in their mandate (Vazquez and 
Chin 2019; Vazquez 2021). This growing concern with environmental 
sustainability can also be seen in the high profile of renewable 
energy in China’s development finance, which has reached 57 per 
cent of total overseas investments in 2020 (Nedopil 2021).
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2.3 Delivery through hybrid bilateral–multilateral channels
China’s new development finance is also characterised by the 
use of both bilateral and multilateral channels, also labelled as 
‘new multilateralism’. This new multilateralism has two dimensions. 
The first is the growing use of earmarked contributions to the 
UN Development System (UNDS). In the past, China was reluctant 
to move to multilateral lending due to a lack of understanding 
of how it works and how traditional multilateral channels implied 
lesser control of how resources are spent, and how outcomes are 
defined and achieved.
While China’s foreign aid remains largely bilateral, the country 
has also been promoting efforts to support and participate in 
aid programmes initiated by international organisations such 
as the UN. Over the last decade, China’s overall contribution to 
the UNDS has quadrupled, with Chinese funding growing at an 
annual average rate of 33.8 per cent between 2013 and 2017 
alone. China’s shares of core funding and assessed contribution in 
its total UNDS funding grew more than that of traditional donors, 
while the share of non-core funding in China’s total contribution 
jumped from 23 per cent in 2008 to 50 per cent in 2017 (Mao 2020).
In the second dimension of the new multilateralism, China has 
also made use of its foreign reserves to create new development 
finance institutions, credit programmes, and special funds 
with both a portfolio diversification and development finance 
objectives. This is the case of the China-LAC Cooperation Fund 
(CLAC), the China-LAC Industrial Cooperation Investment Fund 
(CLAI), the Fund for Cooperation and Development between 
China and Portuguese-Speaking Countries, and the Silk Road 
Fund. One could also add the China Investment Corporation (CIC) 
and many regional-oriented initiatives as vehicles for investment 
based on Chinese sovereign reserves. These initiatives culminated 
in the creation of the AIIB and the NDB, headquartered in China 
but with a global reach and membership.
3 Causes of the transformation of China’s development finance
China’s development finance was shaped by the changes that 
the country experienced at both international and domestic levels, 
particularly the consolidation of its aid governance structure.
3.1 Consolidation of aid governance structure
Traditionally, China’s aid governance structure involved more 
than 20 central line ministries, commissions, and agencies as 
well as their provincial counterparts (Zhou and Xiong 2017). 
The decision-making power of China’s aid lies with the central 
government, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). Three central government agencies – the Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 
and MOF – are authorised by the State Council to implement 
aid projects; ensure that the aid agenda is aligned with broader 
foreign policy goals; and oversee China’s financial contributions 
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to multilateral development organisations (Vazquez, Mao and 
Yao 2016).
In addition to the three major players, the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST), the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the Ministry 
of Education (MOE), the National Health and Family Planning 
Commission (NHFPC), and other line ministries also take part in 
China’s foreign aid according to their sectorial expertise and 
by the request of MOFCOM or their counterpart agencies in the 
partner country. MOFCOM also works closely with the China Exim 
Bank on concessional loan policies and their implementation. The 
Chinese embassies abroad coordinate and manage foreign aid 
projects in the field.
It has long been debated how to make better use of China’s 
growing foreign aid budget and justify its benefits to the 
domestic public. Over the past decade, mid- and long-term 
foreign aid plans, country strategies, and evaluations have been 
developed though they remain unpublicised (ibid.). While Western 
perceptions often assume deliberate secrecy (Brautigam 2009), 
Chinese scholars have attributed this to system complexity and 
fragmentation (Hu and Huang 2012; Huang and Hu 2020). Within 
a highly decentralised aid architecture, the diverging interests of 
the bureaucratic and corporate actors can be seen. These actors 
either regard foreign aid as an instrument for exercising diplomatic 
influence on the international stage and deepening cooperation 
with selected countries or as a way of assisting domestic 
businesses to expand exports and investments (Morgan 2019).
This has called for enhanced efforts to speak with a unified 
voice and facilitate concerted action in formulating policies and 
identifying projects (Zheng 2016; Vazquez, Mao and Yao 2016). To 
strengthen coordination, MOFCOM, MFA, and MOF led 24 central 
ministries, commissions, and units to establish China’s foreign 
aid interagency liaison mechanism in 2008. In 2011, this liaison 
mechanism was upgraded into an interagency coordination 
mechanism (Zhou and Xiong 2017) and in 2018, the China 
International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) was 
created to provide central coordination and to better integrate 
China’s foreign aid governance. Since 2013, the BRI has served as 
the primary platform for institutionalising China’s development 
finance. The establishment of CIDCA has placed the BRI at the 
core of Chinese aid, helping to articulate China’s foreign and 
economic policy priorities down to the projects supported by 
the country.
Despite the lingering coordination challenges, this transformation 
has favoured the development of a strategy that articulates 
the three new features of China’s development finance 
down to project level. CIDCA has unveiled the new directions 
of China’s development finance in the 2021 White Paper 
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China’s International Development Cooperation in a New Era 
(SCIO 2021). This White Paper distinguishes from the 2011 and 
2014 versions in three ways. First, the scope and objective of 
China’s foreign aid are no longer limited to traditional bilateral 
‘aid’ or ODA, but a broader discussion about China’s South–
South development, trade, and investment with both bilateral 
and multilateral actors. Second, China’s foreign aid is, for the 
first time, partially framed in a non-Chinese framework with the 
2030 Agenda presenting an important vision guiding China’s 
contribution to partner countries. Third, the categorisation of 
what constitutes foreign aid has evolved by including the  
South–South Cooperation Assistance Fund (SSCAF) as an 
emerging financing modality in addition to grants, interest-free 
loans, and concessional loans.
3.2 An evolving international setting
At the international level, the transforming global political and 
economic landscape, especially after the 2008 financial crisis 
and the decline in aid supplied by traditional donors, laid the 
conditions for China and other emerging economies to play an 
even more substantial role in development finance (Manning 
2006; Walz and Ramachandran 2011; Hernandez 2017; Gu and 
Carey 2019; Acker and Brautigam 2021). In the case of China, this 
includes the use of foreign aid, trade, and investment not only 
to respond to the growing demand from other emerging and 
developing economies, but also to create a more favourable 
international environment for China’s own development (Fuchs 
and Rudyak 2019).
China’s rapidly expanding development finance has led to 
concerns on its supposedly adverse economic and environmental 
impact in the developing world (Acker and Brautigam 2021). For 
some authors, China’s foreign aid sets agendas (Jakóbowski 2018) 
and imposes conditionalities (Hirst 2008), making it difficult for 
countries to pay their debts. For other authors, China’s foreign 
aid fails to comply with local and international environmental 
standards, keeps local business out of the market, and relies 
excessively on Chinese workers, thus not creating enough local 
jobs (Dussel and Armony 2015; Gallagher 2016).
The adoption of the 2030 Agenda, the Paris Agreement, and the 
Addis Ababa Action Agenda has created additional pressure on 
China, not only to avoid, mitigate, and compensate any adverse 
impacts of its foreign aid, but also to align its development 
finance and institutions with the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) and other internationally agreed commitments 
on climate and development. At the domestic level, China’s 
economic rebalancing and commitment to carbon neutrality 
by 2060 has started a transition towards a new growth pattern 
in which domestic consumption, services and high technology, 
and sustainability are to rise relative to investments and exports, 
manufacturing, and resource-intensive production.
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The greater public scrutiny and the international commitments 
on climate and development, coupled with China’s economic 
rebalancing and growing awareness of the risks associated with 
its foreign aid, have motivated the country to emphasise the 
financial and environmental sustainability of its development 
finance. This can be seen in the reduction of CDB and Exim 
Bank loans from US$75bn in 2016 to US$4bn in 2019, signalling a 
possible rebalancing of China’s overseas development finance 
over concerns around borrowing countries’ indebtedness and loan 
sustainability (Gallagher and Ray 2020; Acker and Brautigam 2021).
The increasing hybrid bilateral–multilateral nature of China’s 
development finance is intended to minimise these credibility, 
reputational, and operational risks on the one side, while 
increasing cost efficiency, directing the country’s capacity to 
changing domestic priorities, and seeking greater influence 
globally, on the other. The growing use of earmarked multilateral 
funds, for instance, reduces concerns over how resources are 
spent, and how outcomes are defined and achieved. This thinking 
is similar in the case of the new multilateral development banks 
as China figures among their top shareholders – an evolution 
from the role China and other emerging and developing countries 
have historically played as borrowers from traditional multilateral 
development banks (MDBs).
4 Beyond China: Asian development finance
China’s new development finance has developed alongside 
the rise of Asia and other emerging countries, as one of the 
many shifts and disruptors that shape twenty-first-century 
multilateralism (Kharas and Rogerson 2017; Ikenberry 2018). Over 
the last two decades, Asia has become the pivot of a structural 
shift in the centre of the world’s economic gravity (Ikenberry 
2018; Mulakala 2021). China and India are at the heart of this 
transformation, accounting for at least one quarter of global 
output and a significant proportion of the world’s middle class. 
The two countries have also had sustained growth rates and are 
projected to be the first and second largest economies in the 
world by 2050.
The rise of China, Asia, and other emerging countries, as part 
of the so-called ‘global South’, has created new and diversified 
forms of development finance, including the very understanding 
of foreign aid beyond the OECD-DAC traditional definition of 
ODA, and the establishment of new international institutions 
such as the NDB and the AIIB (Bhattacharya and Llanos 2017; 
Fejerskov, Lundsgaarde and Cold-Ravnkilde 2017; Gray and Gills 
2018). While these shifts have contributed to an increasingly 
fragmented landscape of institutions, norms, and standards 
(Chaturvedi et al. 2021), they have also allowed development 
models and experiences, other than those of traditional donors, 
to shape these very institutions, norms, and standards. For 
example, NDB and AIIB focus on infrastructure lending as a 
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leverage to economic growth, in contrast to that of traditional 
MDBs, which have marginalised infrastructure investment to 
prioritise institutional reforms in borrowing countries (Vazquez, 
Roychoudhury and Borges 2017).
4.1 Asian versus Western approaches
These emerging approaches to development finance are based 
on domestic development experiences that are substantially 
different from those in the West. Similarly to China, other Asian 
countries have emphasised infrastructure, industrialisation, and 
foreign direct investment as essential drivers of growth with the 
potential to trickle down into poverty reduction (Stallings and Kim 
2017; Gabor and Brooks 2017; Mawdsley 2021). These countries 
would also have contributed to the emphasis on state–private 
capital hybrid formations and state-supported development 
financing (Mawdsley 2015, 2018). This is noticeably different 
from the Western model, which emphasises immediate poverty 
alleviation and conditionality to promote democracy, human 
rights, and ‘good’ governance in the poorest countries, especially 
in sub-Saharan Africa.
Asian development finance also tends to come as a package, 
with a mixture of aid, loans, export credit, and investment (Zheng 
2020; Mulakala 2021) to secure natural resources or expand the 
overseas market for their domestic firms. This occurs alongside 
the promotion of the economic development of their poorer 
neighbours through exports and integration into regional 
production networks (Stallings and Kim 2017). China’s official 
financing, for example, is less concessional than World Bank 
financing in comparable settings, in addition to systematically 
offering higher interest rates, shorter maturity lengths, and less 
generous grace periods (Morris, Parks and Gardner 2020). This 
would demonstrate the novelty of the commercial nature of 
Chinese development finance as part of a package of aid and 
commercial loans vis-à-vis Western models.
The combination of aid, trade, and investment has, in fact, 
historical precedents in many parts of the world, but lost 
momentum as newly independent countries realised its costs 
(Kaplinsky and Morris 2009). More recently, traditional donors 
have been attempting to reform the ODA system thus: ‘increasing 
alignment of aid with partner countries’ priorities, systems and 
procedures and helping to strengthen their capacities’ (OECD 
2008: 3), and to use aid to leverage private investment to help 
promote economic growth (UN 2002). The Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness and the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for 
Development set two different, if not opposing goals for foreign 
aid: aid effectiveness is important for development, but aid is only 
part of the solution to development. Ideally, donors can delink aid 
and commercially oriented capital or trade flows and connect 
aid with investment. In reality, this dual goal creates a dilemma for 
the donor community as untying aid requires donors to focus on 
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the public interests of the recipient countries whereas leveraging 
private investment requires attention to the business prospects of 
aid programmes.
In the post-Covid-19 era, the sizeable financial and political risk 
underpinning China’s global infrastructure boom, particularly 
in the BRI economies, leaves China’s development finance 
open to the possibilities of huge default losses. It is therefore in 
China’s interest to eventually pay more attention to the domestic 
issues of partner countries, which may lead to a more flexible 
application of the ‘no-strings-attached’ principle. This could be 
done, for instance, through the joint design of projects to better 
understand the local reality and to manage any political and 
economic risks that could harm project viability and long-term 
sustainability. In the meantime, traditional donors have revised 
their definition of ODA to add a new international standard – 
Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD) – to 
monitor a broader range of funding, including private resources 
mobilised through official means, that help countries reach 
the SDGs. This convergence between the traditional donors 
and emerging economies on aid conditionality may lead 
them towards an alternative model that is more inclusive and 
development oriented.
There is also a global trend towards hybrid forms of bilateral–
multilateral development finance. While multilateral development 
organisations remain the major source of development finance, 
there is a growing tendency of donors to earmark funds and 
use ad hoc initiatives to exert greater bilateral influence on 
international organisations, raising a debate that the system is 
evolving towards ‘à la carte’ multilateralism (Vazquez 2021; OECD 
2020). This is evident in the substantial increase in non-core 
funding in the UN system, designated by donors for specific 
purposes in accordance with their bilateral interests.
Though this hybrid is mainly shaped by traditional donors, such 
as the US and the UK, who remain the major shareholders and 
funders of the multilateral development system, it is convenient 
to China and other Asian and emerging economies as they step 
up contribution to the multilateral system. According to the OECD 
(2020), growing contributions from the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa) to the UN system, coupled with their 
establishment of new multilateral organisations of which they 
are main shareholders, attest to their rise in influence. Their share 
of total multilateral contributions to the UN system, while still 
relatively low at around 4 per cent in 2018, has increased steadily 
over the past decade.
4.2 New versus past Asian approaches
While Asian countries share features of development finance 
that are noticeably different from Western donors, there are also 
marked differences between how Asian development finance is 
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conceived and practised today and its earlier versions. China 
and India have, for instance, added ‘twenty-first century pivots’ 
(Mulakala 2021: 522) to the East Asian post-war development 
finance. This has been done by: 
 l Emphasising investment in big-ticket connectivity schemes 
such as the BRI and the Asia–Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) 
to stimulate growth and reduce poverty. This is an evolution 
of the East Asian post-war model as it integrates individual 
infrastructure projects under a broader development 
framework that combines Asian growth-led models with 
Western notions of poverty alleviation.
 l Increasing multilateral cooperation through the new 
development banks – in which China and India figure among 
the top shareholders. This could mean a new economic and 
political geography of international development cooperation 
substantially different from that of previous Asian approaches 
and even the Bretton Woods system (Carey and Li 2016). 
This new geography could also point to new narratives 
based on Asian development experiences and the global 
transformations that will have Asia at its epicentre.
There is also diversity among the current Asian approaches 
and between Asian and non-Western, non-Asian countries. 
For example, despite sharing the commercial and multilateral 
features of East Asian development finance, India has not yet 
placed the same emphasis on environmental sustainability. 
Likewise, the commercial and multilateral features of the Asian 
development finance are generally not shared by non-Western 
countries outside Asia, especially in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. The new development banks have been combining 
aid, trade, and investment under the same institutional mandate 
while emphasising environmental sustainability, and could 
become the locus for convergence among these different 
approaches in the future.
5 Conclusion
In the past decade, a new development finance model has been 
on the rise. This new model was shaped by the transforming 
global political and economic landscape as well as China’s 
evolving aid governance structure and long-term development 
goals. Drawing from development experiences in China and other 
Asian countries, this new development finance model is refocusing 
the global debate on the importance of combining aid, trade, 
and investment under financially and environmentally sustainable 
frameworks, and channelling development finance through 
multilateral arrangements to catalyse structural transformation.
This new Asian development finance adds ‘twenty-first 
century pivots’ (Mulakala 2021: 522) to the East Asian post-war 
development finance by refocusing infrastructure investment from 
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individual projects towards big-ticket connectivity schemes that 
stimulate growth and reduce poverty. It also elevates China and 
India to top shareholders in new multilateral development finance 
institutions and relies on partnerships with the private sector to 
complement state capacity. Despite being markedly different 
from Western experiences by emphasising principles such as 
equality, horizontality, non-conditionality, and mutual benefit, 
this new Asian development finance increasingly converges 
with traditional donors on the use of earmarked multilateral 
funding, the conditionality of development cooperation to ensure 
economic and environmental sustainability, and the lack of 
coherent strategies for integrating aid, trade, and investment.
The Covid-19 pandemic has triggered a surge in demand for 
development financing in all developing countries, particularly 
low-income countries. It has also pointed to the need to think 
towards new models for post-pandemic recovery, beyond 
emergency relief. In this new context, the new Asian development 
finance could signal new narratives to address countries’ short-, 
medium-, and long-term development needs. Future research 
could look at how Western notions of development sustainability 
have emphasised countries’ financial ability to repay debts and 
the use of safeguards to avoid, mitigate, or compensate any 
negative impacts of investments. These notions seem to oppose 
the more development-oriented notion of sustainability, as 
understood by China and other Asian and emerging economies: 
that privileges the catalytic role investments can play in 
generating additional positive impact.
Notes
*  This IDS Bulletin was produced as part of the UK Anchor 
Institution for the China International Development 
Research Network, funded by the Foreign, Commonwealth 
& Development Office (FCDO). The opinions expressed are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or 
policies of IDS or the UK government.
1 Karin Costa Vazquez, Scholar, Fudan University, China and 
Associate Professor and Assistant Dean, O.P. Jindal Global 
University, India. 
2 Corresponding author: Yu Zheng, Professor, School of 
International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, 
China. Email: yzheng@fudan.edu.cn.
3 Estimated based on the data from the China–Africa Research 
Initiative and Boston University Global Development Policy 
Center (2021). Chinese development finance flows include aid, 
loans, foreign direct investment, and trade to Africa. See  
www.sais-cari.org.
4 In 2015, China pledged US$5bn in grants and interest-free 
loans; in 2018, the total pledged foreign aid, when concessional 
loans were included, increased to US$15bn. See MOFCOM 
(2015, 2018).
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